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Red Means Green:
The Disruption of the Statutory Construction
Process in Gustafson to Harmonize Section 12(2)




Against the backdrop of the stock market crash of 1929 and the
Depression,1 the Securities Act of 19332 (hereinafter the 1933 Act) was enacted
by Congress primarily to replace the notion of caveat emptor3 with a system of
full disclosure4 in the case of the offers and sales of securities. 5 Hence, the
* I am indebted to Professors Morgan Shipman and Therese Maynard for their helpful
comments on this paper. In addition, I wish to thank my parents, family, and friends for
their constant encouragement and support during law school. This paper is dedicated to the
lasting memory of my brother David.
1 James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 29,30 (1959).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
3 Caveat emptor means "buyer beware." BLACK's LAw DICrIoNARY 222 (6th ed.
1990).
4 See I THOMAS L. HAzEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SEcuRrpsIE REGuLATION § 1.2,
at 7 & n.4 (3d ed. 1995).
5 "Security" is defined quite broadly under section 2(1) of the 1933 Act. The statute
provides in pertinent part:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994).
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m1933 Act requires the registration of any security being offered to the
public, 6 subject to a number of exemptions, 7 and prescribes a process by which
6 The disclosure process mandated by section 5 is implemented by preparing and
delivering a registration statement and a prospectus. Section 5(a) of the 1933 Act prohibits
the sale or delivery of any security without first filing with the SEC a registration statement
which has become effective. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1994). Section 5(b)(1) prohibits the
sale of a security by means of a prospectus which does not meet statutory standards
contained in section 10. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1994). Section 5(b)(2) of the 1933 Act
prohibits the sale of securities which are not accompanied by a prospectus. See 15
U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1994). Furthermore, section 5(c) prohibits the offer of securities for
sale before the registration statement is filed. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994).
7 Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act provide exemptions from section 5's registration
requirements. See HAZEN, supra note 4, § 4.1, at 183-86. Section 3(a) exempts from
registration the securities of governments (federal and state), charitable organizations,
banks, savings and loans, and common carriers, which are regulated under other federal
statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1994). Section 3(b) authorizes the SEC to exempt
securities if it finds that registration "is not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved [a $5 million dollar ceiling]
or the limited character of the public offering." See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994).
In Regulation D, the SEC exercised its section 3(b) authority by adopting Rules 504
and 505, and the 4(2) exemption in Rule 506. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .506 (1996).
Rule 504 exempts from registration any offering in a 12-month period amounting to less
than $1,000,000 (decreased by amounts sold in reliance on other exemptions). See 17
C.F.R. § 230.504. This exemption is aimed at smaller businesses and is not available to
1934 Act reporting companies. Rule 505 permits a company, including 1934 Act reporting
companies, to sell up to $5,000,000 in securities (reduced by amounts sold in reliance on
other exemptions) in any 12-month period without registering, provided the sales are to no
more than 35 unaccredited investors. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505. Accredited investors are
wealthy persons and institutions who are less likely to require government protection in
making investment decisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15)(i)-Cii) (1994). SEC Rule 215 defines
"accredited investors" as used in section 2(15)(ii) to include several categories. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.215 (1996).
Another crucial exemption is the section 3 exemption for wholly intrastate offerings,
which applies only to issuers doing business in a state who offer and sell securities only to
residents of that same state. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994). A single offer of shares for
sale to a nonresident will void the exemption. See, e.g., Busch v. Carpenter, 598 F. Supp.
519 (D. Utah 1984),judgment aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 827 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987).
Congress believed that federal regulation was unnecessary in these situations because of the
availability of state regulation and the close proximity of the purchaser to the seller.
In contrast, section 4 exempts specific types of transactions. Perhaps the most
important of these is section 4(1), which exempts "transactions by any person other than an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer." See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994). This exemption means that
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required information must be disseminated to investors in the form of a
prospectus. 8
Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act provide potent private remedies for
violations of the Act, 9 and, in addition, the 1933 Act contains a general anti-
fraud provision. 10 Section 12(2)11 provides in pertinent part:
Any person who offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
once the security is sold to the investing public, the public may trade without any concern
about the registration or prospectus delivery requirement of section 5. Section 4(1) therefore
exempts these so-called "secondary transactions" from having to meet the requirements of
section 5. See supra note 6.
Section 4(2), the "private placement" exemption, exempts "transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). This exemption for
nonpublic offerings by issuers is widely used by both closely held and publicly traded
corporations. See HAZEN, supra note 4, § 4.21, at 250. In order to flesh out the section
4(2) exemption, the SEC promulgated Rule 506 as part of Regulation D. Rule 506 permits
all companies to sell an unlimited amount of securities in an issuance if sales are limited to
35 unaccredited investors and an unlimited number of accredited investors. The issuer must
reasonably believe that all unaccredited purchasers are "sophisticated" and therefore
capable of protecting themselves without the assistance of a registration statement and
statutory prospectus. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(2)Ci), 230.501(a)-(e) (1996). Accredited
investors, on the other hand, are presumed to be sophisticated, although an unsophisticated
purchaser may act through a sophisticated purchaser representative. See HAZEN, supra note
4, § 4.22, at 261. Accordingly, Rule 506 provides a "safe-harbor" for any issuer planning a
private offering that satisfies the rule's requirements. See id. at 260-66.
8 Section 10(a)(1) of the 1933 Act states what information must be contained in the
"prospectus" given to offerees in compliance with the section 5 mandate. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77j(a)(1). However, Congress provided a broad statutory definition of the term
"prospectus" in section 2(10) of the 1933 Act, which states that "[tihe term 'prospectus'
means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written by
radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."
15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
9 Section 11 creates a right to damages for a buyer arising from misstatements or
omissions in a registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994). Section 12(1) provides
for a right of rescission for any sale of an unregistered security where the security was
required to be registered under section 5 of the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994).
Section 12(2) also provides for a right of rescission where the sale is made by means of a
false prospectus or oral communication. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
10 Section 17 prohibits material omissions and misrepresentations in the offer or sale of
securities, irrespective of whether they are registered under the 1933 Act, but does not
expressly provide for private remedies. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994).
11 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
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of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospecus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be
liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of
any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security.
12
In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 13 the Supreme Court resolved a split in the
federal appellate circuits concerning the scope of liability under section 12(2)14
when it held that the meaning of the term "prospectus" for purposes of section
12(2) was limited to a statutory prospectus contained in a registration statement
soliciting the public to acquire securities. 15 In narrowing the scope of relief
available under section 12(2) in Gustafson, Justice Kennedy, writing for a 5-4
majority, abandoned the very same traditional literal approach to statutory
construction that he championed one year before in the landmark case of
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,16 which eliminated
liability for aiders and abettors under section 10(b), 17 and consequently Rule
10b-5, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter the 1934 Act). 18
Justice Thomas, writing for an unusual coalition of dissenters that included
Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, sharply chastised the
majority for its willingness to disrupt the process of statutory interpretation 19
12 Id. (emphasis added).
13 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
14 Compare Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that section 12(2) does apply to secondary transactions, as well as public
offerings) with Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that section 12(2) does not apply beyond public offerings to secondary
transactions).
15 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1073-74; infra Part IV.C.
16 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (following a very literal plain meaning approach in finding
no basis either in the language of section 10(b) or in the legislative history to support the
view of imposing private liability on aiders and abettors).
17 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
18 See Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
19 The disruption of the process of statutory interpretation refers to the Court's
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by ignoring the statutory definition of prospectus provided by Congress in the
1933 Act, in order to achieve the majority's own policy preferences regarding
the scheme of private liability under the federal securities laws.20
This Case Comment will analyze the Gustafson decision and address the
implications of the majority's cavalier approach to statutory interpretation with
respect to the private liability scheme of the federal securities laws, as well as
larger concerns of the proper interpretive role of the federal courts.2 1 Part II
reviews the background to Gustafson, focusing on the incremental restriction of
the implied civil remedy for fraud in Rule lOb-522 by the Supreme Court in the
past two decades and the subsequent rebirth of the once dormant section 12(2)
express private right of action. This discussion will also emphasize the strict,
literal approach applied consistently by the Supreme Court in narrowing the
scope of Rule lOb-5. Part III discusses the conflict in the federal appellate
circuits with respect to the scope of section 12(2). Part IV reviews the facts,
procedural history, holding, and reasoning of the Gustafson decision. Part V
analyzes Gustafson and discusses its implications for the private liability
scheme of the federal securities laws and the proper interpretive role of the
judicial branch. Part VI raises some additional implications of the decision.
II. BACKGROUND TO GUSTAFSON
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for any person, directly
or indirctly,... [to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities Exchange]
abandonment of its normal method of analyzing statutes. This disruption will be explained
in Part IV in the discussion of Gustafson and analyzed again in Part V.A.20 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
21 This Case Comment title's reference to "red means green" has three purposes.
First, "red means green" reminds the reader that the GustfIon Court ignored a red light,
namely the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that one should not proceed beyond the
plain meaning of a statute where the language is unambiguous. In effect, the Court treated
that red light as if it were green and proceeded directly to its intended policy goal of
harmonizing section 12(2) with its Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence. Second, "red means green"
refers to the methodology that the Court employed in order to obfuscate the plain meaning
of section 12(2). In the end, the Court would have one believe that Congress's intent to say
"red" (i.e., section 2(10)'s statutory definition of prospectus) really meant "green" (i.e., the
narrower definition of prospectus as defined in section 10). Third, the title hints at the
Gustafson Court's subtle message to the lower courts to continue their tough stance toward
securities fraud plaintiff bringing federal actions.
22 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1996); see infra text accompanying notes 27-31.
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Commission may prescribe."23 In 1942, the Commission, pursuant to the
power conferred upon it by section 10(b), promulgated Rule 10b-5, which
prohibits, inter alia, "mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact or
... omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading."24
Although there is no express civil remedy provided for a violation of
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, an implied private right of action was first
established under Rule lOb-5 by a federal district court in 1946.25 In 1971,
after twenty-five years of tacit acquiescence in the development of a Rule 10b-5
private liability scheme in the district and circuit courts, the Supreme Court
confirmed the existence of the Rule 10b-5 private action with little discussion.26
23 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act only makes activity
unlawful to the extent that the Securities Exchange Commission (hereinafter Commission)
adopts a rule prohibiting the activity. See id. Therefore, courts have largely focused on
whether the Commission has acted within the scope of its authority pursuant to section
10(b). See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
24 Rule lob-5 reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fict necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
25 The Rule lOb-5 implied right of action was established in Kardon v. National
Gypswn Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
26 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions began to limit the scope of the private right of action
under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-
55 (1975) (holding that in order to maintain a Rule lOb-5 action, the plaintiff must be either
a purchaser or seller of the securities in question); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214
(ruling that a showing that the defendant acted with scienter rather than mere negligence is
required to maintain a Rule lOb-5 action); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
473-474 (1977) (stating that the conduct of the defendant in a Rule 10b-5 action must be
"deceptive"); see also infra Part ]I.A.
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A. The Supreme Court's Incremental Restriction of the Rule 10b-5
Action
In 1976, the Supreme Court began to assert itself by insisting upon a literal
approach to statutory construction with respect to implied private actions for
violations of Rule 10b-5.27 In the watershed case of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,28 the Supreme Court held that an element of scienter was required
in order to maintain an action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 29 thereby
refusing to read section 10(b) and its private remedy under Rule 10b-5, to
impose liability for mere negligence.30
In Ernst & Ernst, the Court defined scienter, as applied to an implied
private action under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, to refer to "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." 31 In a footnote, the Court
did leave open the possibility that this definition could be relaxed somewhat by
writing that "certain areas of the law [consider] recklessness... to be a form
of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act." 32
Consequently, the lower federal courts seized the Court's invitation to define
scienter by a less stringent standard, namely that of recklessness. 33
Nevertheless, proving recklessness rather than mere negligence still remained a
formidable task for plaintiffs bringing Rule 10b-5 actions.
B. The Rebirth of Section 12(2)'s Express Private Right of Action
Ernst & Ernst gave the securities plaintiffs' bar a reason to seek other more
desirable avenues of relief, given the difficulty in pleading and proving fraud in
a Rule 10b-5 action.34 Section 12(2)'s express private action, once largely
27 See infra text accompanying notes 28-33.
28 425 U.S. 185.
29 See id. at 212.
30 The Ernst & Ernst Court properly focused on the "manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance" language contained in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, as this language grants
and limits the authority of the Commission to promulgate Rule lob-S. See id. at 214.
31 Id. at 194 n.12.
32 Id. Even though the Court declined to decide whether reckless conduct would satisfy
Rule lOb-5's scienter requirement, the rule at common law in an action in deceit equated
scienter with a reckless disregard for the truth or the making of a statement with no belief in
its truth. See, e.g., Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (House of Lords 1889).
3 3 See Louis Loss, Commentary, T7 Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105
HARV. L. REv. 908, 910 (1992).
34 Over the years, the federal courts have established a significant number of
procedural and doctrinal barriers, in particular at the pleading stage of Rule lob-5 fraud
19961 1371
OHIO STATE LAWJOUWAL
considered to be redundant given the broad scope of the Rule 10b-5 implied
private action, 35 arose from the ashes to become the new darling of
disappointed investors and the securities plaintiffs' bar.36 Notwithstanding
section 12(2)'s limitation of any recovery to a rescissionary measure37 (with
only a minor exception)38 and privity requirement,39 the express private action
under section 12(2), in contrast to Rule 10b-5, actually places the burden on the
defendant to demonstrate that he "did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known," of the untruth or omission.40 Thus,
section 12(2)'s negligence-based standard provided a purchaser with a more
actions. For example, federal courts require Rule 10b-5 claims to comply with the
heightened particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), as fraud lies
at the core of such claims. See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust BanCorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124,
1128 (2d Cir. 1994); Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 650 (3d Cir. 1991).
Congress has also recently codified procedural and substantive barriers of its own
dealing with the allegation of fraud in securities class action lawsuits. The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 became law on December 22, 1995 following the United
States Senate's override of President Clinton's veto of the bill. Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). Championed as a central
part of the House GOP's "Contract with America," among other things, it requires plaintiffs
to allege concrete facts for each allegation of fraudulent behavior. See David R. Sands,
Senate Vote Completes Override of ainton Veto; Mite House Lobbying Effort Fails;
Lawsuit-Reform Bill Passes, 68-30, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at 2A. See generally
JAMES HAMILTON, PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REIoRM Acr OF 1995: LAw AND
EXPLANATION (CCH 1996).
35 See Steven Thel, Essay, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation
Matter?, 63 FORDHAML. REV. 1183, 1189 (1995).
36 See Loss, supra note 33, at 910.
37 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
38 This exception to a rescissionary remedy exists where the purchaser sells the
security. See HAZEN, supra note 4, § 7.5, at 410-11. The purchaser is entitled to recover
the out-of-pocket loss incurred in selling the security at a price below what he or she
initially paid for the security. See id. § 7.5.3, at 438.
39 The requirement of privity is embedded in the language of section 12(2), which
states that "[a]ny person... who offers or sells a security ... shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994). In fact, the failure of
section 12(2) to provide relief to a defrauded seller is frequently cited as a primary reason
for creating Rule lOb-5 and implying a private right of action thereunder. See, e.g.,
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRmEs LAW HANDBOOK § 15.01, at 15-1 to -2 (1993);
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 944-48 (4th ed. 1990);
Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for
Fraudulent Trading in Post-Distbution Markets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 873 n.143
(1991).
40 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
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attractive basis for bringing an action than the recklessness requirement of Rule
1Ob-5.41
HI. THE Cmcurr CoNniCT REGARDING THE SCOPE OF SECTION 12(2)
The broad language of section 12(2)'s express right of action created a
much more attractive remedy for a disappointed investor than did the narrower
Rule 10b-5 action. 42 As more investors brought actions under section 12(2) in
response to the Supreme Court's restriction of the implied private action under
Rule 10b-5, a split emerged in the federal circuits in the last five years
concerning section 12(2)'s scope.43 This debate focused on the question of
whether section 12(2) provided a remedy for both public offerings and
secondary purchases of securities or merely the former of the two transactions.
A. The Third Circuit's Approach to 12(2)
The first federal circuit to squarely address the debate over the scope of
section 12(2) was the Third Circuit in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker,
Inc.44 In Ballay, the plaintiff-investors sued their brokerage firm, inter alia,
under section 12(2) for alleged oral misrepresentations concerning the book
value of certain securities issued by a company that had recently emerged from
bankruptcy. 45 The district court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Naftalin,46 held that the plain language of section 12(2)
supported a broad reading of the scope of that provision to include both initial
and secondary market transactions. 47 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the
judgment, holding that the language and legislative history indicated that
Congress did not intend section 12(2) to be made available to protect
purchasers in secondary market transactions. 48
In examining section 12(2)'s language, the Third Circuit focused on the
41 See Loss, supra note 33, at 910; see also Catherine M. Epstein, Comment,
"Reasonable Care" in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 372
(1981).
42 See Loss, supra note 33, at 912-13.
43 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
44 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
45 See id. at 684-85.
46 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (holding that a customer's illegal short sales violate the 1933
Act's antifraud provision, section 17, as a fraud on the broker conducting the transaction).
4 7 See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 686-87. For an earlier discussion of the crucial distinction
between initial and secondary market transactions, see supra note 7.4 8 See id. at 692; see infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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meaning of the words "oral communication" as used in section 12(2) in the
phrase "prospectus or oral communication." 49 The Third Circuit relied
primarily on the canon of statutory construction noscitur a socils ("a word is
known by the company it keeps") to define oral communication in section
12(2). Employing this canon, the Third Circuit reasoned that because the term
"prospectus" is typically associated with an initial distribution of securities, the
term "oral communication" must be limited as well to initial distributions.50
Thus, under this line of reasoning, the Third Circuit interpreted the language of
section 12(2) to refer only to initial trading of securities.51
The Third Circuit also found nothing in the legislative history52 or
structure53 of the 1933 Act indicating a specific intent to extend section 12(2)
beyond the 1933 Act's primary purpose of regulating initial distributions. 54 At
least one commentator praised the Third Circuit for pushing the envelope by
embracing a structural, albeit largely policy-oriented, approach to statutory
interpretation. 55 Arguably, in Gustafson, the Supreme Court followed the
Third Circuit's structural and policy-oriented approach in construing the scope
of section 12(2).56
49 See Ballay, at 688.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 690 ("Congress' intent in enacting the 1933 Act was clearly to regulate
initial offerings.").
53 See id. at 691. The Third Circuit noted:
In addition, the 'structure' of the Act supports the more narrow reading of section
12(2). Section 12(2) follows section 11 and section 12(1), which govern the registration
of securities and create civil liability for sales of unregistered securities, respectively,
and appears before section 13, which provides the statute of limitation for both sections
11 and 12. All of these sections deal with initial distributions. Congress' placement of
section 12(2) squarely among 1933 Act provisions concerned solely with initial
distributions of securities indicates that it designed section 12(2) to protect buyers of
initial offers against fraud and misrepresentation.
Id. (citations omitted).
54 1d. at 690.
55 See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralism in the Interpretation qf
Satutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1439, 1496-1507 (1994) (using the Ballay court's
methodology as a prime case study to illustrate one court's extensive use of "structure" in
judicial interpretation of a statute).
5 6 See infra Parts IV & V.
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B. The Seventh Circuit's Literal Approach to 12(2) in Pacific Dunlop
Holdings, Inc.
In Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 57 the Seventh Circuit
refused to follow the Third Circuit's lead two years later when it addressed the
scope of section 12(2). In Pacific Dunlop, the plaintiff asserted that
misstatements in the representations obtained from the shareholder seller in
connection with a private stock purchase agreement violated section 12(2).58
Based on the Third Circuit's holding in Ballay, the district court dismissed the
claim. 59 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that
the private stock purchase agreement was a prospectus within the meaning of
that term in section 12(2) and reading the scope of section 12(2) to apply to
secondary market transactions, as well as public offerings. 60
In its reasoning, the Seventh Circuit first emphasized the broad statutory
definition of prospectus provided by Congress in section 2(10) of the 1933
Act. 61 In addition, in stark contrast to the reasoning of the Third Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit found no basis in the structure or legislative history of the 1933
Act to ignore the statutory definition of prospectus in section 2(10).62
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the term "prospectus" as used in
section 12(2) by reference to the broad definition of this term contained in
section 2(10). The Seventh Circuit then concluded that initial and secondary
market transactions were within the scope of section 12(2).63
IV. THE GUSTAFSON DECISION
A. Facts
In 1989, the shareholders of Alloyd Holdings, Inc., (Alloyd Holdings)
57 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993).
58 See id. at 579. The private stock purchase agreement would be a secondary market
transaction or a private sale. Such a private resale of stock in a secondary market
transaction is typically subject to an exemption from section 5's registration requirement for
any public offering. See supra notes 6-7.
59 See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 579.60 See id. at 595.
61 See id. at 582-83. ("[Wle cannot say that the... text of section 12, and in
particular the context of the word 'prospectus' in section 12(2), require[s] a definition of
prospectus contrary to the broad definition of section 2(10)."). Id. at 588.
62 See id. at 588.
63 See id. at 595.
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agreed to buy substantially all of the issued and outstanding common stock of
Alloyd, Inc., (Alloyd) a manufacturer of plastic packaging and heat sealing
equipment, from the three shareholders of Alloyd (led by Gustafson) in a
private contract of sale. 64 According to the terms of the private contract of sale,
Alloyd Holdings agreed to pay the sole shareholders of Alloyd approximately
$18.7 million for the stock plus a payment ("adjustment amount") of
approximately $2.1 million, which reflected the estimated increase in Alloyd's
net worth from the end of the previous year, the last year for which verifiable
financial data was available. 65 The private contract of sale contained numerous
representations and warranties by the selling shareholders, including assurances
that Alloyd's financial statements fairly presented the company's financial
condition and that no adverse material change in financial condition had taken
place since the date of the last financial statement audit.66 The private contract
of sale provided for an adjustment to be given to a disappointed party if the
year-end audit and financial statements revealed a variance between the
estimated and actual increased value. 67
Subsequently, the year-end audit did reveal that Alloyd's actual earnings
were lower than the estimates relied upon by the parties in negotiating the
approximately $2.1 million adjustment amount. 68 Accordingly, the buyers,
Alloyd Holdings, had the right to recover an adjustment in the amount of
$815,000 plus interest under the terms of the private contract of sale.69 Instead
of seeking this amount, the purchasers brought suit to rescind the private
contract of sale pursuant to section 12(2).70
64 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1064 (1995). Alloyd, Inc. was
incorporated, and its stock had been issued in 1961. In 1989, Gustafson engaged KPMG
Peat Marwick to find a buyer for the stock of Alloyd, Inc. KPMG reached an agreement
with Alloyd Holdings, Inc., a new corporation formed to acquire the Alloyd stock. See id.





70 See id. The buyers in Gustafson were obviously more sophisticated than the typical
* small investor. They negotiated a deal that specifically contemplated an adjustment amount
to be given to the disappointed party. Therefore, given the fact that the parties to the private
contract of sale had agreed to a contractual remedy if the financials fell short of the seller's
representations, the Gustafton majority may have felt justified in narrowing the scope of
section 12(2) to prevent the plaintiff-buyers from obtaining a right of rescission. Perhaps this




The disappointed purchasers of Alloyd stock brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking outright
rescission of the sales contract under section 12(2).71 Alloyd alleged that
statements made by Gustafson and his coshareholders regarding the financial
data of their company were inaccurate, rendering untrue the representations and
warranties section of the contract. 72 Alloyd further claimed that the private
sales contract was a prospectus within the meaning of section 12(2), so that the
misstatements in the sales contract gave rise to civil liability under section
12(2). 73
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment by Gustafson
in reliance on the Third Circuit's opinion in Ballay, holding that section 12(2)
applied only to initial offerings of stock.74 On review, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the lower court's ruling and remanded the case back
to the district court due to the intervening contrary decision of the Seventh
Circuit in Pacific Dunlop.75 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
this conflict in the federal circuits. 76
C. The Majority Opinion
A glance at the composition of the majority and dissent shows that
Gustafson was indeed a peculiar opinion. The majority was composed of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, the opinion author Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Souter, while the dissent consisted of an unusual alliance
of Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.77




7 4 See id. For an earlier discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning in Ballay, see
supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
75 See id. For an earlier discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Pacific
Dunlop, see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
76 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1065.
7 7 Justice Thomas dissented, joined by all the other dissenters, while Justice Ginsburg
also authored a separate dissenting opinion joined by Justice Breyer. This alliance is unusual
when one considers the perceived differences in judicial philosophy between Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas, on the one hand, and Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, on the
other.
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Bank of Denver decision,78 began his analysis in a peculiar way. Rather than
examining the statutory definition of prospectus provided by Congress in
section 2(10), Justice Kennedy first turned to section 10 of the 1933 Act to
interpret the meaning of the term.79 Justice Kennedy stated that the language of
section 10 provides a broad mandatory requirement that a prospectus shall
contain the information contained in the registration statement. 80 Justice
Kennedy argued that although section 10 does not actually define the term
"prospectus," section 10 does "instruct us what a prospectus cannot be if the
Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, one
in which the operative words have a consistent meaning throughout."81
Accordingly, under Justice Kennedy's reasoning, the sales contract in question
was clearly not a prospectus within the meaning of section 10, because a
prospectus under section 10 is limited to documents associated with a public
offering that are subject to the requirement of filing a section 5 registration
statement.82 Therefore, Justice Kennedy turned to the question of whether
prospectus must be given the same interpretation in sections 10 and 12 of the
1933 Act. 83
Based on the earlier reasoning developed by the Court to disregard section
2(10) and use section 10 as the starting point for defining the term
"prospectus," the majority stated that it must use section 10 as "guidance and
instruction for giving the term [prospectus] a consistent meaning throughout the
[1933] Act."8 4 Justice Kennedy then relied on the Third Circuit's reasoning in
Ballay to conclude that the structure of the 1933 Act also supports his
determination that the term "prospectus" must be given the same meaning
throughout the statute.85
Justice Kennedy also examined the overall structure of the 1933 Act. First,
78 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
79 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066.
80 See id.
81 Id. at 1066-67.
82 See id. at 1067.
83 See id. at 1066-67.
84 Id. at 1067.
85 See id. ("The conclusion that prospectus has the same meaning, and refers to the
same types of communications (public offers by an issuer or its controlling shareholders), in
both [sections] 10 and 12 is reinforced by an examination of the structure of the 1933 Act.")
(emphasis added); see also supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. Although Justice
Kennedy stated that a structural approach merely reinforced its reading of the term
"prospectus" in the 1933 Act, it is noteworthy that Justice Kennedy's opinion took this next




Justice Kennedy's structural analysis of the 1933 Act initially catalogued the
Act's provisions and concluded that under the "most natural and symmetrical
reading" of the entire Act, section 12(2) liability cannot be imposed in the
absence of an obligation to distribute a section 10 prospectus. 86 Second, the
majority claimed that section 12(2)'s own terms exempting prospectuses for
government-issued securities from the reach of its coverage would make it
nonsensical to grant immunity to a private seller based solely on the reason that
the seller's misstatements happen to relate to government-issued securities.87 In
contrast, the Court reasoned that the exemption in section 12(2) for
prospectuses for government-issued securities only becomes comprehensible
when one interprets the term "prospectus" in section 12(2) consistent with
section 10, thus limiting the term "prospectus" to offering documents
distributed in connection with public offerings. 88 Third, the majority stated that
the primary purpose of the 1933 Act was to regulate initial distributions of
newly-issued stock from corporate issuers.89 Therefore, the Court argued that
it could not conclude that section 12(2) created "vast additional liabilities" that
are designed to provide a remedy for obligations created under the 1933 Act. 90
Justice Kennedy thereafter rejected Alloyd's argument, based on Pacific
Dunlop, that the term "prospectus" under section 12 represents a "broader set
of communications than the same term in [section] 10."91 Justice Kennedy
criticized the dissent's "discovery" of two different types of prospectuses:
formal prospectuses that are subject to both section 10 and section 12, and
informal prospectuses, subject only to section 12 but not section 10.92 In an
odd twist, Justice Kennedy then contended that since the 1933 Act never
explicitly mentions formal or informal prospectuses, the burden of persuasion
should be placed on those who view prospectus as meaning "one thing in
[section] 12 and another in [section] 10 to adduce strong textual support for that
conclusion." 93
86 See id.
87 See id. at 1067-68.
88 See id. at 1068.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 Id. The Seventh Circuit's Pacific Dunlop decision states: "[TIhe 1933 Act
contemplates many definitions of a prospectus. Section 2(10) gives a single, broad
definition; section 10(a) involves an isolated, distinct document-a prospectus within a
prospectus; section 10(d) gives the Commission authority to classify many." Pacific Dunlop
Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 1993).
92 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068.
93 Id. at 1068-69. This statement illustrates the perverse logic of the majority. The
majority has ignored the statutory definition of the term "prospectus" in section 2(10) up to
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The Court also dismissed Alloyd's argument, concentrating on the word
"communication" within the broad statutory definition of prospectus in section
2(10), that a material misstatement in any communication offering a security
for sale gives rise to liability under section 12(2). 94 The Court maintained that
Alloyd's reading of communication in the statutory definition of prospectus in
section 2(10) is inconsistent with at least two canons of statutory
construction. 95 First, the Court stated that a broad reading of communication to
include every written communication would violate the canon that the Court
will attempt to avoid an interpretation that renders some words altogether
redundant. 96 The Court maintained that a broad reading of communication
would render "notice, circular, advertisement, [and] letter" redundant, as they
all are forms of written communication. 97 Second, the majority argued that a
broad reading of section 2(10) is inconsistent with the canon of noscitur a
sociis.98 Accordingly, the majority concluded that under this canon of
construction, the plaintiff-purchaser's suggested interpretation of section 2(10)
would give it unintended breadth.99
Justice Kennedy offered instead a "better reading" of section 2(10). 10° He
argued that inclusion of the term "communication" in section 2(10), along with
a list of other documents used for public communication suggests that
communication refers to documents of wide dissemination.101 Citing the "well
understood" meaning of prospectus in 1933 as a mere term of art referring to
any document soliciting the public to acquire securities from the issuer, Justice
Kennedy adopted a functional reading of communication as relating to writings
that are akin to the other writings specified in section 2(10), such as "notice,
circular, [and] advertisement." 102
this point in the opinion. Instead, the majority jumped to section 10, an operational
provision, and used it to define the term "prospectus" under section 12(2). Now, as the
coup de grace, the majority, suddenly insisting on a plain meaning textual analysis, placed
the burden on the proponents of the view that the term "prospectus" means something
different in section 12(2) than in section 10, an operational provision. The majority has
created its own presumption that the term "prospectus," wherever it appears in the 1933
Act, refers to public offerings. However, this presumption is backwards given the broad
statutory definition provided by Congress in section 2(10).
94 See id. at 1069; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
95 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 50.
99 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 1070.
102 See id. Justice Kennedy actually cited the second edition of Black's Law Didionary
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Justice Kennedy's conclusion, that the word "prospectus" is merely a term
of art referring to a document that describes a public offering of securities by
an issuer or controlling shareholder, is the fundamental weakness of the
Court's analysis of section 12(2)'s scope in the Gustafson decision. This
cornerstone holding in Gustafson reversed a long-standing belief in the proper
interpretation of section 12(2) consistent with the broad definition of prospectus
in section 2(10).103 This broader interpretation of the scope of section 12(2)
had led nearly all contemporary commentators to believe prior to Gustafson
that section 12(2) was applicable to both private and secondary transactions, as
well as public offerings. 104
Surprisingly, Justice Kennedy then actually sought to buttress the holding
that the term "prospectus" relates to public offerings by citing the Naftalin
decision, the same case relied on by the Seventh Circuit in Pacific Dunlop.105
The Naftalin Court had determined, by reference to both the statutory language
and legislative history of the 1933 Act, that section 17(a) "was 'intended to
cover any fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in the
course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market
trading.'"'1 6 Justice Kennedy observed that the Naftalin Court labeled its own
holding as "'a major departure from th[e] limitation [of the 1933 Act to new
offerings].'" 10 7 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy distinguished Gustafson from
Naftalin, concluding that "[n]o comparable legislative history even hints that
[section] 12(2) was intended to be a free-standing provision effecting expansion
of the coverage of the entire statute. The intent of Congress and the design of
published in 1910 to illustrate this "well understood" meaning of prospectus. See id.;
(BLACK'S LAw DICTiONARY 959 (2d ed. 1910) (defining "prospectus" as a "document
published by a company... or by persons acting as its agents or assignees, setting forth the
nature and objects of an issue of shares... and inviting the public to subscribe to the
issue").
103 Justice Ginsburg underscores this point in her dissent. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at
1082-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104 See, e.g., HAROLD S. BLOom ENTAL, SECmiIs LAW HANDBOOK § 14.09, at 14-
34 to -48 (1994); Steven W. Hansen et al., Developments in Broker-Customer Litigation, 25
REV. SEc. & COMMODTmES REG. 193, 197-99 (1992); Loss, supra note 33; Therese
Maynard, The Future of Securities Act Section 12(2), 45 ALA. L. Rav. 817 (1994)
[hereinafter Maynard, The Future of Section 12(2)]; Maynard, supra note 39, at 847-49;
Robert A. Prentice, Section 12(2): A Remedy for Wrongs in the Secondary Market?, 55
ALB. L. REV. 97, 101-03 (1991); Robert N. Rapp, The Proper Role of Securities Act
Section 12(2) As an Aftermarket Remedyfor Disclosure Violations, 47 Bus. LAw. 711, 712-
14 (1992).
105 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1070-71.
106 Id. at 1070 (alteration in original) (citing Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78 (1979)).
10 7 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78).
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the statute require that [section] 12(2) liability be limited to public
offerings."1s In Justice Kennedy's view, section 12(2) lacked the same degree
of support in the legislative history as section 17(a), and thus was not capable
of being a "free-standing provision" like section 17(a) under the reasoning of
Naftalin.109
Finally, Justice Kennedy tersely stated the large policy concerns raised by
Alloyd's proposed broader reading of section 12(2). 110 Without explicitly
mentioning the policy impact that a broad reading of section 12(2) would have
on the restriction of the Rule 10b-5 private liability scheme that the Supreme
Court has overseen since the Ernst & Ernst case, Justice Kennedy's words do
seem implicitly to address this issue:
It is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liability
[provision in section 12(2)] for every casual communication between buyer and
seller in the secondary market. It is often difficult, if not altogether impractical,
for those engaged in casual communications not to omit some fact that would,
if included, qualify the accuracy of a statement. Under Alloyd's view any
casual communication between buyer and seller in the aftermarket could give
rise to a rescission, with no evidence of fraud on the part of the seller or
reliance on the part of the buyer. In many instances buyers in practical effect
would have an option to rescind, impairing the stability of past transactions
where neither fraud nor detrimental reliance on misstatements or omissions
occurred. We find no basis for interpreting the statute to reach so far. I l l
108 See id. at 1071.
109 See id. Justice Kennedy responded later in the opinion to Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting argument, echoed also in the Commission's amicus brief, that the legislative
background of the 1933 Act supports Alloyd's construction of section 12(2). See id. Justice
Kennedy cited a House Report which stated that section 12 liability is to be limited to that
which is in connection with a document soliciting the public. Moreover, in reliance on the
House Report, Justice Kennedy concluded that "[n]othing in the legislative
history... suggests Congress intended to create two types of prospectuses, a formal
prospectus required to comply with both [sections] 10 and 12, and a second, less formal
prospectus, to which only [section] 12 would be applicable." Id. at 1073.
110 See id. at 1071.
1 Id. at 1071 (emphasis added). Again, the particular facts of Gustafson do seem to
make the result justifiable only inasmuch as the sophisticated plaintiffs clearly used section
12(2) as an option to rescind in this case. Nevertheless, the breadth of the Court's holding in




D. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas's basic premise was that the majority had literally turned
the process of statutory interpretation on its head.112 Justice Thomas believed
that the proper approach to interpreting section 12(2) was to start with that
provision itself.1 13 After examining section 12(2)'s language, Justice Thomas
then suggested resolving any ambiguities in that provision by turning to the
1933 Act's definitional section, section 2(10).114 Only if that inquiry proved
fruitless did Justice Thomas advocate analyzing the overall structure of the
1933 Act to clarify any uncertainties about the plain language of the statute. 115
Following such a textual analysis, Justice Thomas concluded that section 12(2)
applied to public offerings, 116 as well as secondary or private sales of a
security.117
In analyzing the language of section 12(2), Justice Thomas conceded that
absent any other statutory direction, one might construe prospectus to mean a
112 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are the main proponents of conventional
textualism on the current Supreme Court. As a conventional textualist, Justice Thomas's
view "[focuses on] the 'text' or 'plain wording' of the statute ... as the starting point for
any construction of law." Chibundu, supra note 55, at 1454.
Justice Thomas essentially argues here that the majority, by ignoring the broad
statutory definition of prospectus provided by Congress in section 2(10), has circumvented
the plain wording of the 1933 Act. Instead, according to Justice Thomas, the majority has
first turned to an operational section of the 1933 Act, section 10, in order to interpret
prospectus in section 12(2) and throughout the statute. See Gustafon, 115 S. Ct. at 1074
(Thomas, I., dissenting) ("Unfortunately, the majority has decided to interpret the word
'prospectus' in [section] 12(2) by turning to sources outside the four corners of the statute,
rather than by adopting the definition provided by Congress.").
113 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1 14 See id. (Thomas, I., dissenting).
115 See id. at 1075-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1 16 Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion incorrectly noted at times that section 12(2),
under the majority's reading, would be limited to an initial public offering. The distinction
between the initial public offering and any registered public offering is a crucial one which
raises the question of how knowledgeable the Court is of fundamental distinctions in federal
securities law. An initial public offering represents the first time that a company relies upon
public financing through the registration and sale of its securities (also known as "going
public"). However, a company may embark on a registered offering again at a later time
that must also satisfy the registration requirements of section 5. See HAZEN, supra note 4,
§ 1.6, at 67-72.
117 See Gutqfson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078 (Thomas, I., dissenting) ("Here, [section] 12(2)
contains no distinction between initial and secondary transactions, or public and private
sales.").
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term of art which describes the transmittal of information in a public offering of
a security for sale. 118 Nevertheless, because Congress did provide a very broad
statutory definition of the term "prospectus" in section 2(10), Justice Thomas
argued that there is no need to look beyond the language of that definition
section to define prospectus in the 1933 Act.1 19 Justice Thomas noted that the
broad definition of prospectus in section 2(10) clearly indicated an intent by
Congress to depart from the ordinary meaning of the term, by including a
prospectus as only one of many documents that qualify under the section 2(10)
definition of prospectus. 120 Therefore, Justice Thomas argued that "[the Court]
should use [section] 2(10) to define 'prospectus' for the 1933 Act, rather than,
as the majority does, use the 1933 Act to define 'prospectus' for [section]
2(10)."121
Justice Thomas sharply criticized the majority for seeking to create
ambiguities in the broad language of section 2(10) under the guise of the
maxim noscitur a sociis.122 He contended that, by narrowly construing the
words following prospectus in section 2(10) to refer only to forms of public
dissemination that a prospectus may assume, the majority had deprived the
definition section of its "[operation] as a safety net that Congress used to sweep
up anything it had forgotten to include in its definition." 123 Given the broad
catch-all nature of the definition of prospectus in section 2(10), Justice Thomas
concluded that, as applied to section 12(2), Congress intended that secondary
or private sales of a security would fall within the scope of the section. 124
Justice Thomas, after analyzing section 12(2) in a manner consistent with
the typical statutory interpretation process, then strongly chastised the majority
for "transform[ing] [section] 10 into the tail that wags the 1933 Act dog." 125
118 See id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 476 (1994)).120 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 1074-75 (Thomas, I., dissenting).
12 2 See id. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justice Thomas continued by stating that "[t]his is a
technique Congress employed in several other provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.").124 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125 See id. at 1076 (Thomas, I., dissenting). Justice Thomas illustrated his point with
an excellent analogy:
Suppose that the Act regulates cars, and that [section] 2(10) of the Act defines a "car"
as any car, motorcycle, truck, or trailer. Section 10 of this hypothetical statute then
declares that a car shall have seatbelts, and [section] 5 states that it is unlawful to sell
cars without seatbelts. Section 12(2) of this Act then creates a cause of action for
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Justice Thomas presented several textual indications in the 1933 Act that
Congress did not intend for prospectus to have a consistent meaning throughout
the statute.126
Analyzing the surrounding text of section 12(2), Justice Thomas argued
that there was no indication in the language of the provision that Congress
intended to limit the scope of section 12(2) to initial public offerings. 127 Justice
misrepresentations that occur during the sale of a car. It is reasonable to conclude that
[sections] 5 and 10 apply only to what we ordinarily refer to as "cars," because it
would be absurd to require motorcycles and trailers to have seatbelts. But the majority's
reasoning would lead to the further conclusion that [section] 12(2) does not cover sales
of motorcycles, when it is clear that the Act includes such sales.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Justice Thomas, these textual
indications that Congress intended prospectus to have different meanings throughout the
1933 Act included:
First, [section] 2(10) defines "prospectus" to include not only a document that "offers
any security for sale" (which is consistent with the majority's reading), but also one that
"confirms the sale of any security." But the majority does not claim that [section] 10
uses the term "prospectus" to include confirmation slips. It would be radical to say that
every confirmation slip must contain all the information that [section] 10 requires; only
the documents accompanying an initial public offering must contain that
information ....
Second, this understanding is reinforced by [section] 2's preface that its definitions
apply "unless the context otherwise requires," 15 U.S.C. § 77b. This phrase indicates
that Congress intended simply to provide a "default" meaning for "prospectus."
Further, nothing in [section] 12(2) indicates that the "context otherwise requires" the
use of a definition of "prospectus" other than the one provided by [section] 2(10). If
anything, it is [section] 10's "context" that seems to require the use of a definition
which is different from that of [section] 2(10).
Third, the dual use of "prospectus" in [section] 2(10), which both defines
"prospectus" broadly and uses it as a term of art, makes clear that the statute is using
the word in at least two different senses, and paves the way for such variations in the
ensuing provisions. To adopt the majority's argument would force us to eliminate
[section] 2(10) in favor of some narrower, common law definition of "prospectus." Our
mandate to interpret statutes does not allow us to recast Congress' handiwork so
completely.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127 See id. (Thomas, j., dissenting) ("On its face, [section] 12(2) makes none of the
usual distinctions between initial public offerings and after-market trading, or between
public trading and privately negotiated sales. The provision does not mention initial public
offerings, as do other provisions of the [1933] Act.").
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Thomas pointed to section 12(2)'s lone express exception for government
securities as indicative of the fact that "Congress knew how to exempt certain
securities and transactions when it wanted to." 128 Responding to the majority's
critique of his own reading of section 12(2) as offering no explanation for
exempting government securities unless section 12(2) is limited to public
offerings, Justice Thomas offered two plausible explanations for the
exception. 129 First, Congress may have decided that the imposition of liability
on private or secondary sellers of government securities is unnecessary, given
the wide availability of information concerning such securities from the markets
or government entities. 130 Second, Congress may have decided to relax the
liability burden on government securities arising from primary and secondary
sales. 131
Justice Thomas attacked the majority's structural argument that the 1933
Act's primary purpose of regulating the distribution of initial public offerings
mandated a reading of its provisions limiting it to those types of sales rather
than extending it to secondary sales.132 Citing Naftalin, Justice Thomas noted
that the Supreme Court had previously held that at least one provision of the
1933 Act, section 17, extended to after-market trading. 133 Justice Thomas
observed that two arguments relevant to the present case were not accepted in
Naftoain concerning the scope of the 1933 Act. 134 First, Justice Thomas stated
that the Naftalin Court was not persuaded by an argument that the structure of
the 1933 Act restricted the scope of section 17 to initial public offerings. 135
Second, he noted that the Naftalin Court had rejected the contention that the
1933 Act's provisions applied solely to initial offerings, while the 1934 Act's
Rule lOb-5 antifraud provision reached secondary sales. 136 Moreover, Justice
Thomas pointed to Supreme Court precedent supporting the proposition that
the 1933 and 1934 Acts often overlap and prohibit similar conduct.' 37
Applying Naftalin to the facts of Gustafson, in contrast to the majority's
conclusion, Justice Thomas found no basis in precedent for narrowly
128 Id. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129 See id. (Thomas, 3., dissenting).
130 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
13 1 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Nafalin, 441 U.S. 768,
799 (1979)).
134 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136 See id. at 1078 (Thomas, 3., dissenting).
137 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 383 (1983)).
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interpreting section 12(2), in order to limit the provisions of the 1933 Act to
initial public offerings.13 1
Reserving his most scathing criticism for last, Justice Thomas sharply
chastised the majority for its policy-motivated analysis of section 12(2). 139
Given the upside-down approach to statutory interpretation employed by the
majority, Justice Thomas inferred that the majority's reading of section 12(2)
reflected a policy fear that a broad reading of section 12(2) to reach secondary
and private purchases of securities would likely increase the level of securities
litigation. 140 Admitting his own belief that a broad reading of section 12(2)
would likely spur litigation, Justice Thomas nevertheless asserted that Congress
must determine the appropriate level of liability for participants in the securities
markets. 141 Citing Central Bank of Denver, Justice Thomas chided the
Gustafson majority (and perhaps, in particular, the author of that opinion,
Justice Kennedy) for jettisoning the basic rationale of that case, that policy
concerns should not "'override [the Court's] interpretation of the text and
structure of the [1934] Act.'" 142 With a degree of remorse, Justice Thomas
noted that "[uinfortunately, the majority's decision to pursue its policy
preferences comes at the price of disrupting the process of statutory
interpretation." 143
E. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, expressed her agreement with
Justice Thomas's persuasive textual critique of the majority, while additionally
arguing that the drafting history and long-standing academic and judicial
understanding of section 12(2), going back to 1933, also weigh in favor of a
138 See id. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
13 9 See id. at 1078-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140 See id. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 1079 (Thomas, I., dissenting). In another subtle reference to Central
Bank of Denver, Justice Thomas suggests that the majority would have been much more
literal and traditional in its approach to statutory interpretation if the case had involved a
statute intended to restrict causes of action in securities cases. As a final matter, Justice
Thomas concluded that the majority has also frustrated the will of Congress by supplanting
the statutory definition of prospectus explicitly provided by Congress in section 2(10) with
one defined by the meaning of the term used by the securities industry. See id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
143 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas continued by stating that "[t]he
majority's method turns on its head the common-sense approach to interpreting legal
documents." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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broad reading of section 12(2) to reach private and secondary sales of
securities. 144 Against this legislative, judicial, and scholarly backdrop, Justice
Ginsburg argued, Congress should be left to decide whether the policy
concerns of the majority are valid and whether to amend section 12(2). 14 5
Justice Ginsburg argued that the term "prospectus" has two discrete
meanings in sections 10 and 12(2), bolstered textually by the broad instruction
in section 2 that definitions apply "unless the context otherwise requires." 146
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Investment Company Act of 1940 itself
recognized that the 1933 Act uses the word "prospectus" in "two different
senses-one in [section] 10, and another in the rest of the [1933] Act." 147
In analyzing the legislative history of the 1933 Act, Justice Ginsburg
pointed to the fact that the drafters patterned the 1933 Act after the British
Companies Act, but conspicuously omitted the importation from the British
statute of language that limited the scope of a prospectus to public offerings.
148
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the House Conference Report, which postdated
the House Report cited by the majority, did not suggest that section 12(2) is
limited to public offerings. 149 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg observed that
commentators, including Felix Frankfurter, the organizer of the drafting team
of the statute, firmly believed that the scope of section 12(2) reached secondary
and private sales, as well as public offerings of securities. 150
Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that subsequent commentators have also
been largely unanimous in the belief that section 12(2) extends beyond public
offerings to private and secondary sales of securities. 151 Although recognizing
the existence of a split in the federal appellate circuits with respect to the
applicability of section 12(2) to secondary transactions, Justice Ginsburg noted
that "every Court of Appeals to consider the issue [of the applicability of
section 12(2) to private transactions] has ruled that private placements [of
144 See id. at 1079-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
145 See id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146 See id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, I., dissenting) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b).
147 Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, I., dissenting).
148 See id. at 1081 (Ginsburg, I., dissenting) (citing James M. Landis, The Legislative
History of the SecurWities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 29, 34 (1959) and SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123 (1953) (supporting view that Companies Act was a
"statutory antecedent" of [United States] federal securities laws)).
149 See id. (Ginsburg, I., dissenting).
150 See id. at 1082 (Ginsburg, I., dissenting). For an explanation of the crucial
operational differences between private, public, and secondary transactions, see supra notes
6-7.
151 See id. at 1082 (Ginsburg, I., dissenting).
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securities] are subject to [section] 12(2)."152 Citing the landmark Blue Odp
Stamps case, 153 Justice Ginsburg argued that, at least with respect to private
placement transactions, the Court should accept this long-standing
interpretation by the lower courts coupled with Congress's acquiescence in that
interpretation. 154
V. ANALYSIS OF GUSTAFSON
Although the Supreme Court's decision can be analyzed from a number of
different perspectives, this Part focuses only on two crucial aspects of the
decision: (1) the framework of statutory interpretation employed by the Court
in its analysis of section 12(2); and (2) the validity of the policy concerns raised
by the majority in Gustafson and whether judicial intervention was warranted
under the circumstances.
A. The Dynamics of Statutory Interpretation in Gustafson
The major problem with Gustafson is the manner in which the majority
ignored the plain meaning of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Sidestepping the
statutory definition provided by Congress in section 2(10) in construing section
12(2), the Court instead applied an approach that defies a precise
methodological label. Arguably, the majority has adopted a structural
approach, "dynamic" approach, or some unconventional variation of a
conventional textual approach. 155 Irrespective of the label one attaches to the
majority's approach, Gustafson represented a drastic departure from the
Court's consistently literal plain meaning approach in construing the federal
securities laws, especially when the case is juxtaposed opposite the recent
Central Bank of Denver decision. Consequently, Gustafson raises significant
152 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350,
360-61 (2d Cir. 1992); Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 587
(7th Cir. 1993); Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1032 (5th Cir.
1990); Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1973).
153 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that in
order to maintain a Rule lOb-5 action, the plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller of
the securities in question).
154 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1082 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Blue Cldp
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733).
155 For a criticism of dynamic interpretation, see Martin H. Redish & Theodore T.
Chung, Derocratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism
in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REv. 803, 831-37 (1994) (criticizing dynamic
interpretation as a usurpation of legislative authority).
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concerns as to the consistency and restraint of the Court.
The majority opinion leaves one guessing as to the approach the Court
chose in interpreting section 12(2). Conspicuously, the Court refused to
examine initially the provision in question, section 12(2).156 Instead the
majority leaped into its analysis by considering an operational provision,
section 10, which uses the term only to indicate what a prospectus must contain
in order to satisfy section 5, the registration and prospectus delivery
requirement of the 1933 Act. 157 Thereafter, the Court used the definition of a
prospectus derived from section 10 to give meaning to section 12(2) before
even considering the statutory definition of prospectus provided in section
2(10). 158 By giving meaning to the definition section, section 2(10), by first
looking to an operational provision, section 10, the Gustafson Court turned the
process of statutory interpretation on its head. 159
Under a literal, plain meaning approach, the Court should have first
examined the language of section 12(2) to decide the proper scope of that
provision.160 Assuming that the plain meaning of section 12(2) contained some
ambiguous language, the majority should have then turned to the statutory
definition of prospectus contained in section 2(10) of the 1933 Act. Indeed, at
this point in the analysis, the Court should have halted its analysis given the
fact that Congress provided a broad definition of prospectus in section 2(10),
clearly intended to sweep all forms of communication under section 2(10). As
Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, Congress expressed a clear intent in
section 2(10) to depart from the ordinary meaning of the term prospectus. 161
Therefore, the majority, by ignoring the intent of Congress to define the term
"prospectus" more broadly in section 2(10) than the ordinary meaning, usurped
Congress's law-making power. 162
The Court appears to have engaged in some form of structural analysis in
156 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, I., dissenting).
157 See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066.
1 5 8 See id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159 See id. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority transforms [section] 10 into
the tail that wags the 1933 Act dog.").
160 Justice Thomas noted that Central Bank of Denver affirms this notion that "'tihe
starting point in every case involving a construction of a statute is the language itself.'" Id.
at 1074 (Thomas, I., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)).
161 See Gutstafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162 See Jane S. Schachter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 ("Our legal culture's understanding
of the link between statutory interpretation and democratic theory verges on the canonical
and is embodied in the principle of 'legislative supremacy.'") (footnote omitted).
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interpreting section 12(2) within the larger framework of the 1933 Act and the
federal securities laws. Structural analysis has been recognized as a legitimate
means of ascertaining legislative intent, but usually is employed to resolve
ambiguity in the language of specific provisions rather than providing a
justification for ignoring them. 163 Therefore, if the majority has engaged in a
form of structural analysis, it has likely been invoked in order to obfuscate the
Court's ulterior goals of achieving its particular policy preferences and bringing
federal securities laws within a coherent scheme of private liability.
Even if the Court intended to adopt a structural approach to the
interpretation of section 12(2) in order to give a consistent meaning to the term
"prospectus," serious concerns of judicial consistency are nevertheless then
raised given the Court's frequent prior unwillingness to abandon a literal
approach to statutory construction in federal securities cases. Most notably, in
Central Bank of Denver, the Court ignored clear stare decisis on the Rule 10b-5
aiding and abetting issue, while relying on a very literal reading of the
statute.
164
In sum, the peculiar and unprecedented approach to statutory construction
of the majority, which ignored the statutory definition of prospectus provided
by Congress, has set a dangerous precedent of either turning the process of
statutory interpretation on its head or adopting a structural approach to
interpretation. Given the near certainty that the Court will reshelve this
structural approach and return to a plain meaning approach in determining
legislative intent, Gustafson remains a troublesome decision to reconcile with
prior Supreme Court decisions like Central Bank of Denver that have insisted
on a literal approach in restricting the scope of Rule 10b-5 and similar private
liability rights of action under the federal securities laws. 165 The majority's
163 See Chibundu, supra note 55, at 1463-64 ("Structural analysis assumes that
meaning can be derived from an examination of relationships. In conventional analysis,
structure refers to the process of relying on the placement or juxtaposition of items of a
statute one to another, or of a statute to other statutes.").
164 See supra text accompanying notes 16-18. Every circuit court that had faced the
issue had recognized aiding and abetting liability under Rule lob-5. See, e.g., Cleary v.
Perfecture, 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1983); IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas,
522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364 (7th
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279
(9th Cir. 1971). See generally David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting; Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972).
165 The Court has rarely employed a structural approach in the past and has typically
insisted on a literal approach to statutory construction. In particular, a strict literal approach
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jurisprudence creates not only practical problems for those practitioners and
judges that must construe the federal securities laws on a daily basis, but also
raises confidence concerns about the consistency of the Supreme Court and the
willingness of the Court to usurp Congress's legislative power to achieve a
policy end.
B. The Policy Argument in Gustafson-Is Judicial Intervention
Warranted to Harmonize the Private Liability Regime Under the
Federal Securities Laws?
The willingness of the majority to commit interpretive heresy by
disregarding the traditional approach to interpreting a statute consistent with its
plain meaning supports an inference that the Court had an ulterior policy
motive for ignoring the statute. Given the Court's gradual restriction of the
Rule lOb-5 implied action from a negligence-based standard to a stricter
recklessness-based standard, a broad reading of section 12(2) to reach private
and secondary sales would have left a fundamental imbalance in the federal
private liability scheme. Professor Steven Thel predicted quite accurately
before Gustafson that "[i]t seems inconceivable that when the Court decides
Gustason it will ignore the possible implications of its decisions for the
restrictive rules it has developed in its Rule 10b-5 cases." 166 Undoubtedly, the
has characterized the Court's approach in recent years to the gradual restriction of the Rule
10b-S action. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
166 Thel, supra note 35, at 1191. Acknowledging the larger constitutional and policy
issues raised by the Court's predicament, Professor Thel noted:
The objection to the Court's construing section 12(2) narrowly to preserve [R]ule
lb-5 precedent is that to do so would usurp Congress' law-making power. The regime
of private liability for violations of [R]ule 10b-5 is judge-made law, and conventional
notions of federal judicial power suggest that such law cannot serve as a basis for
ignoring the statute. This is a powerful objection, and perhaps the Court should just
apply section 12(2) literally, regardless of [R]ule 10b-5. Nonetheless, the Court is likely
to consider the 10b-5 issue, although it may not acknowledge doing so. Despite the
problem of apparent overreaching, if the Court believes that denying some classes of
buyers the remedy of section 12(2) will improve the law, then the Court should
consider doing so even though section 12(2) indicates that it is available to all buyers.
Congress may have decided in 1933 that recovery should be allowed to all buyers
under section 12(2) without proof of scienter or reliance-I think it did. However,
Congress has not decided to change the substantial body of private-liability law that the
courts have developed since then. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the putative
legislative base for [R]ule 10b-5 liability, was not the law when section 12(2) was
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majority did take into account the policy impact of a broad reading of section
12(2) on Rule 10b-5 precedent. Certainly, the majority's narrow reading of
section 12(2) in Gustafson has closed out the possibility of "extensive liability
for every casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary
market." 167 In limiting the scope of section 12(2) to purchases of securities in
public offerings, the majority has indeed harmonized Rule 10b-5 and section
12(2) with respect to secondary and nonpublic offerings (i.e., private
transactions or "placements").' 68
The majority is misguided, however, in its attempt to harmonize the judge-
made Rule lOb-5 implied private right of action with the express right of action
under section 12(2). In the latter, Congress explicitly provided for a right of
action that should not merely be cast aside in order to achieve the majority's
end of a coherent private liability scheme. Indeed, as Professor Thel noted,
"Mhe regime of private liability for violations of Rule lOb-5 is judge-made
law, and conventional notions of federal judicial power suggest that such law
cannot serve as the basis for ignoring the [1933 Actl." 16 9 Irrespective of
whether the Court has merely engaged in judicial "updating" 170 of the 1933
Act or simply interpreted prior legislative silence as a license to refine the
private liability regime in federal securities law, 171 it is the proper role of
Congress, and not that of the Supreme Court, to determine the appropriate
level of liability for participants in the securities markets. 172
enacted. Even when section 10(b) was enacted in 1934, no one expected it to serve as a
basis for private liability, let alone for a scheme of liability that would supplant most of
what the statutes did.
Id. at 1192 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
167 Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1071.
168 See infra discussion Part VI.A. For an explanation of the crucial distinctions
between public, secondary, and private offerings, see supra notes 6-7.
169 Thel, supra note 35, at 1192.
170 Judicial updating entails a re-evaluation or reinterpretation of a statute in light of
changed circumstances. For a criticism of this approach in the face of express language, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamdc Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479,
1496-97 (1987); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988) (stating that statutes should be read as if they were enacted
yesterday); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 405, 422-24, 493-97 (1989).
171 Some commentators have argued that this interpretation of legislative silence is not
the Court's responsibility. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It"• The
Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 177, 186 (1989)
(condemning the notion that legislative silence in response to judicial decisions constitutes
acquiescence).
172 Professor Thel, on the other hand, attempted to argue that the Supreme Court
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Undoubtedly, the majority feared that a broad reading of section 12(2) to
reach secondary and private transactions would likely increase securities
litigation and tie up federal dockets. Nevertheless, such policy concerns should
not override an interpretation of the language and structure of the 1933 Act,
where Congress provided express language to the contrary. By discarding a
common-sense textual approach to interpreting a. statute, the Court not only
frustrated the intent of Congress when it enacted section 12(2), but also
rendered those fundamental principles of statutory interpretation less certain
and secure.
In summary, although there may have been some strong policy reasons for
narrowing the scope of section 12(2) in order to harmonize the private liability
regime under the federal securities laws, the means (i.e., the disruption of the
traditional textual process of statutory interpretation) necessary to achieve that
end have displaced Congress's proper legislative role in this area. Given the
recent override of President Clinton's veto of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Congress seems as poised as ever to assert itself and
make necessary corrections in the area of federal securities laws. 173
Accordingly, the Court should leave future determinations of this nature to
Congress. The Supreme Court's decision has not only shown an anti-
democratic lack of faith in Congress's ability to amend the language of the
1933 Act, but has served to undermine its own proper interpretive role.
should assume a law-making role in Gustafson based on "the need for coherent and stable
[federal securities] law, especially in light of changing circumstances, and the notion of
delegated law-making power." Thel, supra note 35, at 1193. With respect to the first
argument predicated on the need for coherent and stable law, Thel argued that the Supreme
Court had largely assumed responsibility in the past for "making the rules for the whole
universe of private securities litigation." Id. at 1195. Accordingly, Thel believed that
because the Supreme Court had itself created the imbalance in the federal securities laws
through its acquiescence in the implied Rule lOb-5 action, the Court had a duty to eliminate
this discontinuity. This argument, of course, concedes the central point of this Case
Comment, namely, that the Court ignored, in Thel's own words, "admirably clear
language" in narrowing the scope of section 12(2). See id. at 1196-97.
173 An argument could be made that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 has ratified in effect the Court's prior restriction of Rule lOb-5, as well as a narrow
reading of section 12(2). See supra note 34. Nevertheless, the Court's transgression in
usurping Congress's law-making role by ignoring the plain meaning of section 12(2) is not
cleansed by subsequent ratification. If anything, Congress may have granted the Court a




A. Alternate Routes to Recovery
Gustafson alters the standards for liability in private placements and
secondary transactions. A disappointed purchaser of securities in private or
secondary transactions can no longer seek relief after Gustafson under the
negligence-based standard of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Instead, a plaintiff
must pursue his claims under the more stringent recklessness standard of Rule
10b-5 under the 1934 Act, which extends to both private and secondary
transactions. 174
Gustafson, however, does not affect the right of a disappointed purchaser
of securities in a private or secondary transaction from bringing a negligence-
based action under state securities law or common law. 175 In fact, shrewd
plaintiffs' bar securities lawyers realize that state law often still provides the
best opportunity for a recovery under a less stringent standard. 176 State
securities law actions are not as likely to give rise to the large nationwide class
actions that have characterized securities litigation under section 12(2).177
174 Section 10(b), fleshed out in Rule 10b-5, is known as the general antifraud
provision and applies to both of these types of transactions. See supra text accompanying
notes 23-24.
175 Each state regulates securities transactions through its own statutes (also known as
"llue sky" laws). Therefore, corporations must comply with the registration requirements
of each state in which they intend to market their shares. The Uniform Securities Act,
produced by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws serves as a model for many states'
securities laws, but because many states have amended the act significantly, there is a lack
of uniformity among the states. See UNIp. SECURITIES Acr, 7B U.L.A. 509-687 (1985 &
Supp. 1996). See generally Marc Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws:
Partly-Sunny Skiesfor Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 395 (1993).
State legislatures have also adopted antifraud and negligence-based actions similar to
those in the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Kittilson v. Ford, 608 P.2d 264 (1980)
(rejecting the Ernst & Ernst scienter standard as inapplicable to the Washington Securities
Act and holding that mere negligence is sufficient to impose liability). In states where the
legislature has not enacted such laws, the common law of fraud would prohibit such
fraudulent practices. See supra note 32.176 See generally Steinberg, supra note 175.
177 There may be a number of other advantages to bringing a state action depending
on the jurisdiction. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B) (Baldwin 1995)
(allowing punitive damages where malice or egregious fraud is shown); Riedel v. Acutote of
Colorado, 773 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd, 947 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing that section 1707.43 of the Ohio statute is a much broader provision than the
parallel federal provision); see also Steinberg, supra note 175.
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However, in light of the recently enacted Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, large nationwide class actions are now universally subject to a
number of procedural barriers that may force disappointed purchasers as a
matter of litigation strategy to seek a state or common law remedy. 178
B. Red Means Green?: Conflicting Messages to the Lower Courts
Gustafson may be interpreted by the lower courts in a number of ways.
First, assuming that one disregards its indefensible approach to statutory
interpretation and focuses on the Court's desired policy result, the decision may
be viewed as a signal to the lower courts that they are free to continue
restricting access in cases of securities fraud. Before Gustafson, many lower
courts had already adopted numerous procedural barriers aimed at curbing the
flow of securities fraud cases into the federal courts. 179 The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act codifies many of these procedures with respect to class
actions.180
A second interpretation, at least prior to the recent enactment of the federal
securities litigation reform legislation, may be that the Court views itself as
having a responsibility to harmonize the imbalance between the section 12(2)
express private action and the Rule lOb-5 implied private action.18 1 This
perceived duty might be linked to the Court's prior acquiescence in the
development of a judicially created implied right of action under Rule 10b-5. In
essence, the Court may have perhaps felt a sense of collective responsibility for
its prior acquiescence in the creation of an implied private right of action. As
the Court has gradually restricted the implied Rule lOb-5 action, acting out of
this collective guilt, the Court may believe itself justified in now harmonizing
the standards of liability under section 12(2) and Rule lOb-5 of the federal
securities laws. This interpretation would seem to explain the otherwise
irreconcilable decisions authored by Justice Kennedy in Gustafson and Central
Bank of Denver 182 Prior to the recent reform legislation, the Court had largely
shaped and refined the Rule lOb-5 action with tacit approval from Congress. 183
Therefore, given the recent initiative of Congress in this area, the Court may
178 See supra note 34.
179 See supra note 34.
180 See supra note 34.
181 Professor Thel offered this argument before Gurtafson as a possible justification for
the Court's usurpation of Congress's law-making power. See supra note 172.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
183 See supra note 172.
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finally relieve itself of this burden and return once again to its proper
interpretive role.
A third and final interpretation may be that the Court is uneasy with the
rigid application of a strictly textual approach to statutory construction where
the practical policy result is perceived as negative. Leaving aside serious
concerns of separation of powers, the Court may feel obligated to seek a
sensible policy result and "update" a statute in light of changed circumstances
when Congress has acquiesced in the Court's interpretation of the statute and
the statute itself is quite old. 184 Nevertheless, while judicial updating may
perhaps be defensible where the language is ambiguous, such judicial
amendment serves as dangerous precedent when the result is the direct
contravention of the unambiguous language of a statute.
In sum, the lower courts are left with any one of a number of possible
interpretations of the methodology and holding in Gustafson. Prior to the recent
reform legislation, "the federal law of private liability for misrepresentations in
securities transactions ha[d] become an ocean of common law, with only a few
inconsequential statutory islands."' 8 5 In light of the new statutory island
provided by Congress, which largely codified many of the procedures and
doctrines of the lower courts, courts may either perceive their role as one of
continued activism in this area or limited by the new assertiveness of
Congress.18 6
C. Impact on Private and Secondary Market Transactions: Is Due
Diligence Dead?
Gustafson addresses many concerns of issuers about unanticipated liability
in secondary and private securities transactions. By forcing disappointed
purchasers in these types of transactions to turn to Rule lOb-5, sellers are
shielded from liability unless they have acted recklessly and the purchaser has
relied on the material misstatement or omission. 187 These stricter liability
standards in secondary and private securities transactions may lead some sellers
to consider reducing the extent of their due diligence procedures in preparation
of disclosure documents used in these transactions.' 88 Nevertheless, most
184 See generally Eskridge, supra note 170; Sunstein, supra note 170.
185 Thel, supra note 35, at 1184.
186 See supra note 34.
187 This shield in no way, however, eliminates the ability of a disappointed purchaser
to seek a state or common law remedy. See supra notes 175-77.
188 See Michael K. Wolensky & Nannette L. Wesley, Due Diligence in Puivate
Placements, in CONDUCr NGDUE DILIGENCE 1995, at 1 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
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purchasers in private and secondary transactions will likely continue to insist on
detailed disclosure documents being offered in the transaction process prior to
such securities purchases. 189 Moreover, issuers and investment banks will
likely continue to engage in detailed due diligence given the reputational and
commercial benefits of such disclosure and the continued existence of state
negligence-based remedies. 190
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most troublesome legacy of Gustafson is the majority's
misguided attempt to harmonize the judicially created Rule 10b-5 implied
private right of action with section 12(2)'s legislatively authorized express right
of action in order, presumably, to achieve the majority's end of a coherent
private liability scheme. Gustafson remains a troublesome decision to reconcile
with prior Supreme Court decisions like Central Bank of Denver that have
employed a literal approach in restricting the scope of Rule lOb-5 and similar
private liability rights of action under the federal securities laws. Certainly, the
"green" signal sent to the lower courts in Gustafton is a confusing one with
far-reaching practical and jurisprudential implications.
Handbook Series No. 23, 1995) ("The words 'due diligence' do not appear in any of the
federal securities laws .... The phrase 'due diligence' has been extrapolated from the
procedures under the federal securities laws which provide defenses under both the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934....").
189 Purchasers that have often become accustomed to receiving detailed disclosure
documents will likely ask for them. In addition, they may seek express warranties and
representations as an additional basis for recovery to protect their investment. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Lachinski, Bankers Say That They'll Continue to Obtain Due Diligence Opinions on
Puivate Deals, CORP. FINANCING WK., Sept. 4, 1995, at 1.
190 See upra notes 175-77.
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